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Abstract 
Terror management theory posits that individuals respond positively to people and ideas 
that bolster their cultural worldviews and negatively to those that threaten their cultural anxiety 
buffers (Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski & Lyon, 1989). Repeated studies have 
shown that people exposed to awareness of immanent death write different kinds and varying 
lengths of story narratives than people not exposed to death prompts prior to writing. The 
purpose of the present study was to address whether priming individuals with thoughts of their 
own mortality would influence the content (references to self, others and emotionality words) 
and structure (narrative length) of autobiographical memory narratives. 
Results indicate that priming individuals with thoughts of their own mortality did not 
have an overall effect on the measures indicated, although mortality salience did interact with 
others variables to produce an effect. It was observed that when primed with death those in the 
non-imagined self condition wrote narratives that contained more references to others. Results 
also indicated that females wrote narratives that were longer in length and contained more 
emotionality in comparison to males. These results support previous findings in the area of 
narrative length and emotion (Friedman & Pines, 1991, see Buckner & Fivush, 1998,2000, for 
reviews). With no clear evidence of the independent effects of mortality salience on 
autobiographical memory future research is needed to clarify the relationship on this topic. 
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Introduction 
Terror management theory (TMT), the idea that people subscribe to cultural worldviews 
and beliefs in order to suppress anxious thoughts of their own mortality (Rosenblatt, Greenberg, 
Solomon, Pyszczynski & Lyon, 1989) was originally inspired by the ideas of Ernest Becker 
(1962, 1973, 1975). According to Becker the realization that death is a part of human life and 
that death can occur at anytime ultimately gives rise to a potentially constricting terror. 
Furthermore, he wrote that the uniquely human awareness of death shapes and motivates human 
behaviors on a day-to-day basis (Becker, 1973); in fact, he argued that one historical 
manifestation of human coping with death is the creation and maintenance of culture. 
The creation of culture and the idea of immortality have emerged as ways to defend 
against this death anxiety. Thus, the creation of culture promises security to those that live up to 
the cultural standards of value (Rosenblatt et al., 1989), and allows human beings to share beliefs 
with other in-group members. This shared goal, ultimately lends to individuals a sense of value 
in a world of meaning. The socio-cognitive account of constructed meaning and value provides 
human beings with the possibility of immortality, be it literal or symbolic--literal in the context, 
for instance, when religion can provide a prospect for the afterlife, or symbolically, in that after 
an individual member ceases to exist, distinct representations of culture still remain (Becker, 
1973). 
Naturally, problems arise when people are faced with those that threaten our worldview. 
If alternate explanations of reality are accepted, confidence drawn from percepts of reality are 
undermined. As this confidence in one's set of beliefs is shaken, overwhelming terror arises and 
anxiety leads us to take on defensive and protective roles. Thus, as Solomon, Greenberg, and 
Pyszczynski (1991) point out, when individual s encounter people who espouse ideas that 
1 
1 threaten their worldview, they tend to devalue them (and judge their ideas as ineffective, ! 
I incomplete, erroneous) and consequently try to convince them to drop their beliefs and take the 
I opposite viewpoint (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991). 
1 
Two General Hypotheses: Terror Management Theory (TMT)J 
I Typically speaking, research using terror management theory as a theoretical framework 
I 
has focused primarily on two hypotheses. One set of research explores how self-esteem serves as 
I an anxiety buffer. Several studies have supported this hypothesis by showing that when self-
I 
esteem is increased, participants exposed to threatening stimuli exhibit less reported anxiety, 
physiological arousal, and anxiety-related defensiveness (Greenberg et aI., 1993). The other set is 
based on the hypothesis that when individuals are reminded of their own mortality, their need for 
faith and meaning in their own worldview is increased. Results of this work have indeed shown 
that mortality salience leads to positive outcomes when interacting with people whose views 
validate one's own worldview and negative outcomes to those who challenge it (Greenberg et 
al., 1990; Rosenblatt et al., 1989). 
Given this social-cognitive function in the service of terror management, TMT predicts 
that people respond positively to those who bolster their cultural constructs (which "buffer" their 
anxiety) and negatively to those that threaten their cultural anxiety buffers (Rosenblatt et aI., 
1989). This process of responding to those that threaten our worldview is driven by an 
unconscious awareness and is not particularly obvious to people employing the proposed 
defenses. By providing an explanation of the ongoing strife that we see in the world, terror 
management theory provides an account for why people invest so much effort into their belief 
systems and why people feel the need to be valued. In tum, this understanding ultimately offers 
insight into a broad array of human behaviors (Burke, Martens & Faucher, 2010). 
2 
Though tested in various ways the most common approach to testing terror management 
theory has been using the mortality salience hypothesis. In fact, a recent meta-analysis of 23 8 
empirical TMT journal articles reported that 83% of studies directly tested the mortality salience 
hypothesis (Burke et aI., 2010). A typical mortality salience study involves having participants 
complete a packet that contains questionnaires assessing personality, as well as a mortality 
salience prime in which participants either write about their own death (experimental group) or 
write about a non-death-related, often negative, control topic (control group). Overall, the 
majority of studies (62.1 %) utilized a control topic that was threatening or negative, whereas 
33.6% used a neutral or positive topic and 4.3% had no control topic. If threatening control 
topics produce smaller effects than less-threatening topics, such as taking an upcoming exam, 
this would suggest that thinking about death is an extreme version of a threatening condition. 
Nonetheless, threats with personal meaning (as opposed to threats not viewed as 
important to self) produce effects more similar to mortality salience than other control topics 
(Burke et aI., 2010). Studies testing the mortality salience hypothesis also include having 
participants encounter a distracter task before completing the dependent measure, which allows 
time for death anxiety to fade from consciousness (Pyszczynski et aI., 1999). Removal ofthis 
delay has been shown to decrease the effect of mortality salience (MS) on the dependent measure 
(Greenberg, Arndt, Simon, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 2000). 
The idea behind priming participants with mortality salience has led to numerous studies 
examining whether mortality salience increases adherence to one's own cultural worldview and 
self-esteem (Burke et aI., 2010). Such studies have indicated that mortality salience provokes 
avoidance of self-awareness. More specifically, those who experience heightened mortality 
salience avoid self-focusing stimuli as compared to those who are not reminded of their own 
3 

mortality (Arndt, Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski & Solomon, 1998). In one study measuring 
narrative length in relation to mortality salience, those who were in a cubicle with a mirror in 
front of them (self-aware condition) and were primed with mortality salience spent significantly 
less time in the cubicles and had a lower word count than those who were either in the non-self­
aware condition (with no mirror present) but were MS-primed, or those who were in a control 
condition where they were primed with taking a difficult exam (Arndt et aI., 1998). 
The Arndt et al. (1998) study also measured the amount of positive and negative thought 
words in individuals' narratives. They found that the thoughts of those who were presented with 
the cue of taking an important exam were more negative than thoughts of those primed with 
mortality salience (MS). Their findings were consistent with other previous research showing 
that self-awareness intensifies negative affect (Scheier & Carver, 1977; Scheier, Carver & 
Gibbons, 1981). Based on these findings, Arndt et al. (1998) concluded that the exam condition 
produced negative rather than positive affect (Arndt et al., 1998). A second study manipulated 
MS using different operationalizations of death awareness; participants completed a self-report 
scale assessing their own death anxiety, or a "general worries about the future" scale. Then they 
were asked to write a brief fictitious story about themselves (internal focus) or about someone 
else (external focus). 
Results of this work indicated that individuals who were asked to use an external focus of 
attention wrote longer stories than internally focused individuals. Moreover, MS-primed 
individuals in the internal focus attention condition wrote significantly less than those in the MS­
primed external focus condition. In relation to emotionality words they found that regardless of 
mortality salience, internally focused individuals expressed more negative content than 
externally focused individuals (Arndt et aI., 1998). 
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The fact that there were no significant findings for the mortality salience conditions can 
be explained by terror management theory, in that messages that amplify the possibility of death 
promote behaviors that enhance self-esteem (i.e., they produce more talk about self). The 
underlying mechanism regarding self-esteem is that when individuals feel that their self-esteem 
is elevated, they derive meaning and feel valued by their society. Subsequently, individuals feel 
connected to an enduring entity, which affords them a sense of symbolic immortality and thus 
alleviates existential anxiety (Gailliot, Stillman, Schmeichel, Maner, & Plant, 2008). That is, by 
investing in a cultural worldview, individuals are able to avoid the experience of existential 
terror in their everyday lives. 
The majority of research on mortality salience includes a dependent variable that 
measures an attitude, either towards a person's own views of self, or the author of a piece of 
writing (a story or an essay) along a very specific theme (usually a fictional situation). A few 
studies, as described above, investigate the impact of mortality salience on narratives produced 
in response to a writing prompt or questionnaire. While these studies have measured time and 
length associated with writing an essay, no studies have looked at the content or structure of the 
narrative beyond a cursory counting of affective words. Moreover, little work has examined the 
impact of mortality salience on more personal types of narratives, such as the kind that are 
reported as descriptions of personal experiences in the past (autobiographical narratives). What 
follows below is a brief history regarding how self and memory interface and how such a relation 
would be a valuable place to study mortality salience. 
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I j Autobiographical Memory 
Autobiographical memories are episodes recollected from an individual's life. In the last 
1 35 years, the study of autobiographical memory has undergone a marked change adopting a 
1 cognitive approach to the interpretation of autobiographical memory within the theoretical 
framework of mainstream memory research. Prior to this approach autobiographical memory 
was almost exclusively psychoanalytic or clinical in orientation and diagnostic or therapeutic in 
aim (Williams, Conway, & Cohen, 2008). 
In constructing autobiographical memories, individuals must utilize information from 
other types ofmemory systems; for example, autobiographical memory is comprised of episodic 
and semantic details of past experiences recalled by an individual and is composed by 
recollecting episodes from an individual's life. These episodes represent a combination of 
specific events, objects, and people present in a given experience in addition to semantic 
knowledge (general facts about the self and world) that supports these details (Williams et aI., 
2008). 
The Selfand Autobiographical Memories 
There is consensus that autobiographical memory and the self are very closely related-
so close, in fact, that some theorists postulate that autobiographical memory i.s part of the self-
system (Conway & Tacchi, 1996). Generally speaking, there are three categories of functions for 
autobiographical memory that serve the individual self related functions, directive functions, 
and social functions. One critical type of self-related function is self-knowledge. Most theorists 
and researchers agree that autobiographical knowledge supports and promotes self-continuity 
and is maintained by the interconnected relationship between the identity and memory about the 
self (Bluck & Levine, 1998). Subsequently, autobiographical knowledge is especially important 
6 
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~ when the self is presented with adverse conditions requiring self change (Robinson, 1986; Bluck 
I & Levine, 1998) as is experienced by those that are exposed to the mortality salience condition. 
I It has also become clear in the research literature that one facet of great importance to 
autobiographical memory is the relation between gender and self. Indeed, one pattern 
1 consistently reported in research is that females describe their personal experiences in greater 
I detail than do males (Fivush, Haden, & Reese, 1996). Part of this more detailed style of memory 
,j
., 
ij talk by females stems from their inclusion of more emotional content in their autobiographical 
1
I 
memories than their male counterparts (Davis, 1991). Previous research investigating adult's 
narrative memories of their childhood has found that women also make more frequent mention 
of other people and relationships in their narratives while men are more likely to talk about 
instances of independence (e.g., Ross & Holmberg, 1990). Most importantly, women appear to 
make more self-references and references to others than do their male counterparts (Thorne, 
1995). 
In relation to data collection, on a whole, studies use two different techniques in order to 
obtain narratives from individuals: either through a verbal interview or a written method of 
narrative collection. Overall, there is no specific reason as to why there are different 
methodologies in obtaining narrative information and ultimately both types of recall methods are 
considered to be valid and provide similar types of narrative content (Cvasa, 2007). 
Given such patterns elucidated in this body of memory research, it is evident that a 
variable of great importance to any examination of the relations between mortality salience and 
autobiographical recall, is a consideration of how gender impacts the inclusion of specific 
content (including emotion and personal references), as well as the length and structure of 
recalled memories. 
7 
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I 
l 
Summary aDd Research Question 
I In summary, the majority of research that manipulates mortality salience utilizes 
I 
( 
questionnaires that elicit specific attitudes regarding the self and other people, Of, instead, centers 
i participant attention on more generic attitudes that do not directly assess individuals. The present 
! 
study sought to explore whether exposure to mortality salient conditions would influence the 
content and structure of individuals' written narratives. As reviewed above, previous research on 
mortality salience has examined participants' written expressions and descriptions of scenarios, 
but little to none of this work has begun to utilize more personally relevant behaviors, such as 
reporting autobiographical memory narratives, as a vehicle for mortality priming and measures. 
To this end, the present experiment sought to determine how autobiographical memory 
narratives are influenced by priming participants with mortality salience or a control condition. 
To be specific, using a method similar to the Arndt et al. (1998) studies, the present study 
explored how memories reported after a mortality priming session differed from those memories 
reported after a non-mortality salience prime. The effects of this manipulation were explored 
across two different conditions: in an imagined self condition and a non-imagined self condition. 
Manipulating the salience of personal-threat (via mortality salience conditions) and the degree to 
which individuals are made mindful of self during memory recall (thus, the imagining of selfvs. 
no specific prompt to imagined self in recalled situations) allows for a close examination into the 
ways that induced anxiety can shape the kinds of memories that are shared with others about 
personal experiences in the past. 
In recognition of the profound role that the self plays in autobiographical memory as well 
as the role of self in self-awareness and self-esteem, two main research goals were investigated: 
1) Determine the extent to which reminding individuals of their mortality influenced or hindered 
8 
the overall length of memories reported by individuals; 2) As well as the amount of emotionality, 
and references to self and others contained within their narratives. 
Consistent with previous research (Arndt et aI., 1998) it was expected that participants in 
the mortality salience imagined self condition would write narratives that were shorter in length 
in comparison to all other conditions. Additionally, previous research has found that individuals 
are highly motivated to protect themselves from the realization that death is inevitable (Arndt et 
aI., 1998); because of this tendency to avoid anxiety, people may not focus on themselves when 
recalling events from personal memory (as that it may increase their own anxiety), it was 
expected that those in the mortality salient condition would write narratives with fewer 
references to self and more references to others than those not mortality primed, regardless of 
being in the imagined self or non imagined self condition. 
The effects of the impact of self-awareness were considered based on previous research 
that suggests that self-awareness intensifies negative affect (Scheier & Carver, 1977; Scheier, 
Carver & Gibbons, 1981). Participants asked to focus upon details of the self in their narrative 
writing were expected to produce more negatively emotional memory stories than those in a non-
imagined self condition (regardless of whether participants were primed with mortality salience 
or not). These results would also be consistent with the results of the Arndt et al. (1998) study. 
The effects of gender were considered for both references to self and others as well as 
positive and negative emotionality words. Gender was considered based on previous research 
that suggests differences between males and females during narrative recall. Females have been 
found to make more self and other references and include more emotion than males (Fivush, 
Haden, & Reese, 1996; David, 1991). Additionally, the effect of gender, consistent with prior 
9 
research (Burke et ai., 2010), was not considered to significantly moderate effects of mortality 
salience or self-awareness. 
I 
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Method 
Participants 
Participants were 236 undergraduate students recruited through the psychology research 
pool using the online SONA system. All participants received research credit for their 
participation in the study. Five participants were excluded from the analysis for failing to follow 
instructions. An additional 11 were excluded for not being able to write about the memory 
prompt that was presented. The final sample therefore consisted of220 participants. Participant 
ages ranged from 18 to 22 years of age, with a mean of 18.92 (SD 1.00). Of this sample, 157 
were female (71 %) and 63 (29%) were male. The participants reported being in years 1-5 of their 
college careers (M= 1.74, SD 0.96). 
Materials 
For all conditions, participants wrote their narratives on a Dell desktop computer using 
Microsoft Word software. Depending on the condition, participants were given a packet that 
contained all of the instructions and materials necessary for the study. Each page of the booklet 
was designed in order to direct the participant along the process (e. g., "open up Microsoft Word 
and type a memory about ... ; "choose an id number for yourself'). The researcher had his or her 
own version of the packets, by condition, available during the course of the experiment. The 
packets that were given to the participants contained a generic questionnaire regarding specific 
demographics (see Appendix A), as well as the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1989), 
which was given to the participants before the mortality salience prime. 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (see Appendix B) was 
included in the packets of materials in order to assess the overall level of self-esteem held by 
participants as a baseline measure of self. This scale contains 10 questions assessing self-esteem 
11 

each with four possible answers from, "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree". The scale ranges 
from 0-30 with scores between 15-25 representing the normal range, and scores below 15 
suggesting low self-esteem. The Rosenberg scale has high reliability: test-retest correlations are 
typically in the range of .82 to .88, and Cronbach's alpha for various samples are in the range of 
.77 to .88 (original sample N=5,024, Blascovich & Tomaka, 1993; Rosenberg, 1986). 
Mortality Salience Prime. Embedded in the packets was the mortality salience prime 
which consisted of having participants, who were randomly assigned to one of two levels of 
mortality salience, respond to two open ended questions in a five minute time period. 
Participants were told that these questions were a part of a recently developed innovative 
personality assessment in which recent research suggests that feelings and attitudes about 
significant aspects oflife tell us a considerable amount about the individuals' personality. 
Participants that were randomly assigned to the mortality salience condition were asked to: 
"Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in you" and, 
"Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you when you physically die 
and once you are physically dead" (see Appendix C). The non-mortality salient (control) 
condition consisted of parallel questions with respect to taking important exams: "Please briefly 
describe the emotions that the thought of an upcoming exam arouses in you" and, "Jot down, as 
specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you when you are taking the exam and 
once you have turned in the exam" (Greenberg, Simon, Harmon-Jones, et aL, 1995; see 
Appendix D). Participants recorded their responses to this priming session by writing their 
thoughts on space that was provided to them under each open-ended question. 
12 
Word Completion Task Participants completed a distracter task in which they were 
asked to complete words by filling in missing letters, for example L _ VE and EX __ T (see 
Appendix E). Participants were presented with a list of 15 word fragments all at once, and were 
asked to fill in the missing letters to form the first word that came to their minds. Five of the 15 
fragments could be completed as words related to death, and most of the fragments could be 
completed to form a few different neutral words each, depending upon the letters selected I. 
Spielberger State Anxiety Inventory (STAI-S). This measure was administered to assess 
the level of anxiety induced in participants by the mortality salience manipulation. The STAI-S 
consists of 20 items (see Appendix F) that ask how the participant felt at the present moment, 
and reflected situational factors that might have influenced anxiety factors, such as, "I feel tense" 
or 1 feel calm". Scores range between 20-80 on the STAI-S, with higher score indicating a 
greater level of anxiety (Spielberger, 1970). 
For analysis of the data, SPSS version 18.0 was used to conduct several Analyses of 
Variance and t-tests. 
1 Although not measured in this design, majority of mortality salience research that uses the word 
completion task includes an additional analysis on the accessibility of death-related thoughts. 
13 

Procedure 
The experimental design was as follows: 
Table 1. Experimental Design 
Mortality Salience j Exam Salience 
Informed Consent Sheet 
Demographic Sheet 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
Mortality Salience Prime I Exam Salience Prime 
Word Completion Task 
Imagined Self Condition Memory Prompt 
or Non-Imagined Self Condition Memory Prompt 
Spielberger State Anxiety Inventory (ST AI-S) 
The study employed a two (mortality salience - present or absent) by two (imagined self 
or non-imagined self condition) by two (female or male) between subjects design, randomly 
assigning participants into one of four conditions: a Mortality Salience/Imagined SelfCondition 
(42 female, 13 male), a Mortality SaliencelNon-Imagined SelfCondition (37 female, 18 male), a 
Exam Saliencellmagined SelfCondition (41 female, 14 male), and a Exam SaliencelNon-
Imagined SelfCondition (37 female, 18 male). 
Upon arrival, each participant was given a consent form that revealed the full purpose of 
the study. After agreeing to continue, the participants in each group were given questionnaire 
packets and were asked to carefully follow all the instructions necessary to complete the study. 
Contained in the packets were a demographic questionnaire and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem 
Scale, as well as the Mortality Salience Condition prime (and a place for participants to write a 
response), and the Word Completion task (distracter). Following all of the questionnaires and the 
distracter task, a written narrative prompt was presented to participants to elicit one 
14 
autobiographical memory. 
With respect to the narrative prompt, individuals were read one of two memory 
instructions, which varied only in terms of how much detail about the self they were asked to 
think about before they began to write their response. Participants in imagined self conditions 
were asked to close their eyes while the experimenter read the prompt out loud to them. The 
imagined self-prompt asked participants to: "Think about your first day of orientation at Seton 
Hall University. Think about the time of day, where you were, what the weather was like, what 
was going through your mind, and any feelings associated with the memory" (see Appendix G). 
Those in non-imagined self conditions were not asked to close their eyes and were simply asked 
to: "Please tell me about your first day of orientation at Seton Hall University" (see Appendix 
H). Participants were allowed five minutes to type out a response to the narrative prompt These 
narratives were then saved to a flash drive, using a secret code number provided by the 
participants. 
After completion of the written narrative the Spielberger State Anxiety Inventory was 
given to participants in order to assess how the participant was feeling at that present moment. In 
total, the data collection took place in a single meeting and lasted for approximately 20 minutes. 
Coding. Written narratives were coded for length, emotionality words and references, 
both to self and other people,using a scheme adapted from Buckner and Fivush (1998), which is 
included as Appendix 1. 
One aspect of narrative structure, the length of the narrative, was calculated by using the 
word count tool on Microsoft Word and then by subtracting out any off-task words in the 
narrative. Off-task words were defined as words that did not contribute to the overall memory in 
general, words such as, "I'm done," or "that's all I have to say," as well as words that repeated 
15 

the memory prompt, such as, "My first day of orientation at Seton Hall University" or "On my 
first day of orientation". 
Narrative analysis was conducted following the Buckner and Fivush (1998) scheme; each 
narrative was assessed individually, word by word, and coded individually along three major 
categories, each containing several sub-categories. 
Emotionality was measured according to the number of emotion words contained in 
written memories; both positive and negative words about emotion states (happy, angry, scared, 
etc.) and emotional behaviors (screaming, crying, etc.) were counted. Only negative emotion 
words and total emotional word count (negative + positive terms) were tabulated, converted to 
proportions (in order to reflect the percentage of participants' narratives that were emotive in 
nature), and included in the analyses described below. 
The second major category, references, was measured by counting any mention of a 
particular person or persons in the narrative memories elicted. Sub-categories of references 
included those that were personal in nature (self references), and those that were in reference to 
other people. The "other references" category also included references that could be classified as 
"we-ness", such as, "us" and "we.". 
To ensure reliability of coding, word counts, emotionality, and references were coded 
first by a primary coder while a secondary reliability coder checked the accuracy of the coding 
on randomly selected 30% of the narratives. Inter-rater agreement (reliability) of the coding 
ranged between 90% and 100% across coding categories. Any disagreement in relation to coding 
was resolved through discussion. 
After the total word counts for each narrative were completed they were then converted 
into proportions in order to provide a percentage of each category occurring within narratives. 
16 

For example, the frequency of selfreferences in each memory was divided by the total number 
of words contained in that particular narrative to yield a proportional measure of self-referencing 
within the memory reported. This methodology provides a more stable conceptualization of 
content when the length of narratives reported by individuals vary (see Buckner & Fivush, 1998 
for a discussion). 
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Results 
Table 2, 3, 4. Mean Proportions (and Standard Deviations) for Narrative Length, 
Emotionality, and References by Gender, Mortality salience, and Self conditions 
Table 2. Mean Number (and Standard Deviations) of Words per Narrative, by Condition 
Mortality Salience Self Condition 
Condition Imagined Self Non-Imagined Self Total 
Males 
Mortality Salience 124.15 (42.73) 136.83 (59.22) 131.52 (52.52) 
Exam Salience 158.14 (76.62) 151.56 (67.29) 154.44 (70.40) 
Total for Males 141.78 (63.86) 144.20 (62.92) 143.16 (62.82) 
Females 
Mortality Salience 174.26 (66.01) 156.16 (50.16) 165.78 (59.45) 
Exam Salience 167.59 (70.16) 167.59 (70.16) 164.63 (5~.62) 
Total for Females 168.18 (58.19) 161.88 (60.84) 165.21 (59.34) 
Total 
Mortality Salience 162.41 (64.62) 149.83 (53.53) 156.12 (59.40) 
Exam Salience 160.98 (56.49) 162.35 (69.03) 161.66 (62.79) 
Total across all 161.70 (60.42) 156.09 (61.80) 158.89 (61.04) 
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Table 3. Mean Proportion (and Standard Deviations) Positive and Negative*Emotion 
Words, by Condition 
Mortality Salience Self Condition 
Condition Non-Imagined Self Total 
Males 
Mortality Salience 2.6 (1.8) 2.2 (1.2)* 2.4 (2.7) 1.3 (1.6)* 2.5 (2.3) 1.6 (1.5)* 
Exam Salience 2.20.5) 2.3(2.1)* 2.4 (1.9) 1.2 0.1)* 2.2 0.7) 1. 7 0.7)* 
Total for Males 2.0 (1.6) 2.2 (1. 7)* 2.4 (2.3) 1.3 (1.4)* 2.2 (2.0) 1. 7 (1.6)* 
Females 
Mortality Salience 2.0 (1.6) 2.8 (1.9)* 2.3 (2.2) 2.5 (2.2)* 2.1 (l.9) 2.7(2.0)* 
Exam Salience 2.2..Qj) mml2 (1.5)* 2.5 (2.1) ~,6J2.Jl* ~.4 (l.8) ~,4[Lff 
Total for Females 2.1 (l.5) 2.5 (1.7)* 2.4 (2.1) 2.6 (2.1)* 2.2 (1.8) 2.5 (1.9)* 
Total 
Mortality Salience 2.1 (1.6) 2.6 (1.8)* 2.4 (2.4) 2.1 (2.1)* 2.2 (2.0) 2.4 (1.9)* 
Exam Salience 2.0 (1.4) 2.2(12)* 2.4 (2.0) 2.2 (2.Q)* 2.2 (l.7) 2.2 0.8)* 
Total across all 2.0 (1.5) 2.4 (1.7)* 2.4 (1.6) 2.1 (2.0)* 2.2 (1.9) 2.3 (1.9)*
--------------_............­
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Table 4. Mean Proportion (and Standard Deviation) of References (Self and Other*), by 
Condition 
Mortality Salience Self Condition 
Condition Imagined S~lf Non-Imagined Self Total 
Males 
Mortality Salience 9.9 (2.3) 3.8 (1.5)* 9.9 (2.7) 72 (3.6)* 9.9 (2.5) 5.7(3.3)* 
Exam Salience 9.1 (2.4) 5.4 (3.6)* 8.9 (2.9) 6.9 (3.3)* 9.0 (2.6) 6.2 (3.5)* 
Total for Males 9.5 (2.4) 4.6 (2.8)* 9.4 (2.8) 71 (3.4)* 9.5 (2.6) 6.0 (3.4)* 
Females 
Mortality Salience 9.7(3.2) 5.8(2.6)* 8.6 (3.0) 8.0 (3. J)* 9.2(3.1) 6.8 (3.1)* 
Exam Salience 9.8 (2.9) 6. 7 (2.9)* 9.6 (2.9) 74 (3.9)* 9.7(4,21 70 (3.4)* 
Total for Females 9.8 (3.0) 6.2 (2.8)* 9.1 (2.9) 77(3.5)* 9.5 (3.0) 6.9 (3.2)* 
Total 
Mortality Salience 9.8 (3.0) 5.3 (2.6)* 9.0 (2.9) 77(3.2)* 9.4 (3.0) 6.5 (3.2)* 
Exam Salience 9.6 (2.8) Q.4fLll* 9.4 (2.9) 72 (1)* 9.5 (2.8) (j,B(3,4)* 
Total across all 9.7 (2.8) 5.8(2.9)* 9.2 (2.9) 75 (3.5)* 9.5 (2.9) 6. 7 (3.3)* 
In order to address if narratives varied across the different conditions a 2 (Mortality 
Salience) x 2 (Self Condition) x 2 (Gender) Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was performed on 
narrative length (total word count) and proportions of narrative content that was emotional or 
referential to self or other people. For these analyses, mortality salience (primed or non-primed), 
self condition (imagined self or non-imagined self) and gender were treated as the independent 
variables (IVs). 
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AnaJysis ofLength 
Results of the 2 (Mortality Salience) x 2 (Self Condition) x 2 (Gender) analysis of 
narrative length revealed a main effect of gender, F(1,219) = 6.012, p=0.015, 1J~ 0.03, whereby 
females wrote, on average, significantly more words than males (see Table 5). 
Table S. Narrative Length by Gender 
Narrative Length 
Males 143.2 (62.8) 
Females 165.2 (59.3) 
This effect of gender, however, was qualified by an interaction. There was a significant 
effect of mortality salience by gender, F(I,109) 1.945, p=0.006, 1J~ =0.07, (see Figure 1). 
When primed with death, females wrote narratives that were longer, on average, in comparison 
to males (see Table 2), across each of the self conditions. This effect was not significant in the 
exam salience condition, F(I,109) 0.596, p=0.442,1J~ =0.01. Narrative length did not vary 
across conditions for males, t(61) -1.461, p=0.149, d=0.37. 
No other significant effects or interactions were found for narrative length. 
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Figure 1. Effect of Mortality Salience and Gender on Narrative Length 
Emotion Words: Total 
A 2 (Mortality Salience) x 2 (Self Condition) x 2 (Gender) ANOVA conducted on the 
total emotion terms was computed by summing the proportions of both positive and negative 
emotionality words into a single unit, namely "total emotion words." It was predicted female 
narratives should contain more emotionality terms, overall, in comparison to males. This was 
found to be significant, F(1,219) 4.799, p=O.030, TJ~ =0.02 (see Figure 2) with females writing 
narratives that contained, on average, more overall emotionality in comparison to their male 
counterparts. No other main effects or interactions were found to be significant for the proportion 
of overall emotionality contained within narratives. 
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Figure 2. Effect of Gender on Total Emotionality Words 
Emotion: Negative Emotionality 
A 2 (Mortality Salience) x 2 (Self Condition) x 2 (Gender) ANOVA conducted on the 
proportion of negative emotional words contained within narratives revealed a main effect of 
gender, F(1,219)=8.090, p=O.OOS, f]~ 0.04, as well as a marginal main effect of imagined self, 
F(1,219) = 2.893, p=O.09, 1J~ =0.01. However, these main effects were qualified by a marginally 
significant interaction of imagined selfby gender, F (1, 219) = 3.62, p=0.OS8, 1J~ =0.02. Follow-
up analyses revealed a significant gender difference in the proportion of negative words reported 
in the non-imagined self condition, t(108)=3.34S, p=0.001, d=0.64. In the imagined self 
condition, the differences were not statistically significant, t(108) = 0.683, p=0.496, d=0.13. See 
Table 3 and Figure 3 for presentation of the percentages. No other effects were found to be 
significant. 
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Figure 3. Effect of Self Condition and Gender on Negative Emotionality Words 
Emotion: Positive Emotionality 
A 2 (Mortality Salience) x 2 (Self Condition) x 2 (Gender) ANOVA conducted on the 
proportion of positive emotion words contained within narratives revealed no statistically 
significant interactions of mortality salience by imagined self, F (1,219) = 0.651, p=0.421,17; 
0.003, mortality salience by gender, F(1.219) 2.052, p=O.153, 17~ = 0.010, imagined self by 
gender, F(1, 219)=0.003, p=O.955, 11; 0.000, and mortality salience by imagined selfby 
gender, F (1,219) = 0.966, p=O.327, 17; 0.005. Additionally the ANOVA revealed no 
statistically significant findings of mortality salience, F(1, 219) = 0.474, p=0.492,17~ =0.002, 
self condition, F(1,219) = 1.225, p=0.270, 11;=0.006, and gender, F(1, 219) = 0.004, p=0.947, 
11; =0.000. 
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AnaJysis on References to SeJf 
A 2 (Mortality Salience) x 2 (Self Condition) x 2 (Gender) ANOVA conducted on the 
proportion of narrative content that was referential revealed a marginally significant mortality 
salience by gender crossover interaction of references to self, F(1,219)= 2.875, p=0.091, TJ; 
=0.01, such that mortality salience leads to an increase in references to self for males but a 
decrease for females and the exam salience condition leads to an increase in self references for 
females but leads to a decrease for males, see Figure 4. However, follow up analyses revealed no 
significant gender effects in either mortality salience condition, t (1 08) = -1.173, p=0.243, 
d=O.13, or exam salience condition, t(108) = 1.217, p=0.226, d=O.23, see Table 4. No other 
effects were significant or approaching significance for self references made by participants in 
their narratives. 
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Figure 4. Effect of Mortality Salience and Gender on References to Self 
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Analysis on Reference to Others 
A 2 (Mortality Salience) x 2 (Self Condition) x 2 (Gender) ANOVA was conducted on 
the proportion of words that were referring to other people. With regards to the effect of self, 
there was a main effect, F(1, 219) = 17.610, p=0.000, 1J~ =D.07, but this was qualified by a 
marginally significant interaction with mortality salience, F(1, 219) = 3.123, p=0.08, 1J~ =0.02. 
Follow up analyses revealed a marginally significant difference in the imagined self condition 
for mortality salience, t (108)=-1.926, p=0.057, cFO.36, with those primed with mortality 
salience expressing less references to others, on average, in comparison to those in the exam 
salience condition. There was no difference in references to others in relation to those that were 
in the non-imagined self condition, t(108) = 0.683, p=0.496, cFO.13. See Table 4 and Figure 5 
for presentation of means. 
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Figure 5. Effect of Self Condition and Mortality Salience on References to Others 
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Analysis ofMortality Salience on Self-Esteem Measures 
Lastly, it is important to be able to distinguish if exposure to the mortality salience prime 
was putting participants in a bad mood; if that is the case than it would be possible that the 
negative affect produced by the open-ended death questions was driving the results found, rather 
than the unconscious thought processes. To test this, scores from the Rosenberg Self-Esteem 
Scale and the Spielberger State Anxiety Inventory were summed together by condition, mortality 
salience or exam salience. Analyses of scores from both of the scales indicated that neither the 
mean scores of the Rosenberg Scale, t (11 0) = -0.836, p=0.472 or the Spielberger Inventory, 
t(110) = 0.119, p=0.316 differed by condition (See Table 6 and Figure 6 for presentation of the 
means). 
Table 6. Mean Score of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale and the Spielberger 
State Anxiety Inventory by Condition 
Mortality Salience Exam Salience 

Rosenberg Scale 
 15.35 (2.47) 15.61 (2.21) 
Spielberger Inventory 37.35 (8.18) 37.45 (8.86) 
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Figure 6. Effect of Mortality Salience on Self Esteem Measures 
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Discussion 
Regarding Narrative Length 
From the perspective of terror management theory, people are motivated to avoid 
awareness of the inevitability of death, regardless of gender. However, in contrast to other 
studies involving the manipulation ofmortality, only males in the mortality salience condition 
wrote narratives that were shorter in length than their female peers. It is possible that this gender 
effect was reflective of a female tendency to write more than males, in general. But it is also 
possible that this finding could be due to a more "reactive" response of males to the death prime. 
Additional analyses investigating the accessibility of death related thoughts expressed in the 
word completion task might help measure the "reactiveness" of the mortality salience prime. 
Socialization practices surrounding cultural stereotypes reinforce males to be less self­
disclosing and emotional as female counterparts. Males faced with a death-related prime, one 
that evokes negative feelings and anxiety, may have written less than any participant in any of 
the other gender and prime conditions as a consequence of feeling uncomfortable in the death­
prime situation. Additionally, autobiographical memory research has consistently shown that 
narratives belonging to females are longer than those of males (Bauer, Stennes & Haight, 2003; 
deVries, Blando & Walker, 1995; Friedman & Pines, 1991). 
The analyses of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale and Spielberger State Anxiety 
Inventory did not reveal significant differences between the prime conditions in terms of 
negative mood or anxiety per se, but gender was not explored as a mediator of this relation. This 
is something to explore in future studies (that is, how gender and mortality salience together 
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might shape expressions of anxiety in narratives, even when describing seemingly positive 
experiences like attending an orientation at a University). 
Regarding Emotionality 
Similar to findings regarding overall length, females' narratives were more emotional 
overall than were males' narratives. They were also more negative in nature (with respect to their 
use of emotion terms) than were males. It is important to take note that this is not simply because 
females' written memories were longer in length, since these significant findings relate to 
proportions ofwords reported in the autobiographical narratives, not frequencies of word 
occurrences. With relation to the self conditions, the results found in the present study partially 
mapped onto previous research which has showed that stimulating self-awareness intensifies 
negative affect (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). The present study found that rather than reporting 
more negative emotion in the heightened self-awareness condition, females reported 
proportionally more negative emotion words in the non-imagined self condition. Results found 
for the males supported the finding of Duval & Wicklund (1972). 
The difference in results may be due to a wealth of previous research findings suggesting 
that females may feel generally more comfortable expressing negative emotions than their male 
counterparts (for a review see Fivush & Buckner, 2000). Perhaps females were especially 
sensitive to the anxious emotions stirred up by both the death-salient prime, and self-aware 
instructions; as such, they may have avoided negativity, as TMT would predict. As a result, they 
were likely to focus on positive emotion in their memories ofUniversity Orientation. Again, 
however, given the finding that gender does not significantly moderate effects of mortality 
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salience or self-awareness (Burke et aI., 2010) this possibility was not investigated. Future 
investigators would do well to conduct such an analysis. 
References to SeJf 
Despite the position by TMT that humans have a propensity to avoid discussion of the 
self in mortality salient situations, the results of the present study did not support this. This 
prediction was based on the expectation that when reminded of one's own mortality a person will 
try to suppress death-anxious thoughts and focus attention on the maintenance and creation of 
cultural scripts, stereotypes, and roles. This focus of attention on culture in situations where 
death anxiety is increased functions to distract attention away from the self per se; thus in the 
context of narrative descriptions of personal experiences, autobiographical descriptions after 
facing personal demise would be expected to contain fewer references to selfin contrast to 
situations when individuals are primed with thought of an upcoming exam (where one would 
make more references to self). 
References to Others 
Given the reasoning that when reminded of ones' own mortality a person will shift their 
attention to the creation of cultural scripts, stereotypes, and roles, it would be expected that 
individuals in the mortality salience condition would make more references to others than those 
in the exam salience condition. However, empirical results indicated the opposite pattern, in that 
those primed with death expressed fewer references to others. Thus, when primed with death 
anxiety, and made aware of self, people are less likely to think about others. 
In a more theoretical vein, the present study contributes to a growing body of research 
concerning self-consequences of mortality salience. A majority of the research conducted on 
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terror management theory has investigated the effects of mortality salience on the subjective 
evaluations to those who threaten or support one's cultural worldview (Arndt et aI., 1998). Such 
studies measured either an attitude towards a person, or sports team, or towards an author of 
essay, while other studies measured behavior and affect, all in response to a worldview threat 
(Burke et aI., 2010). 
Results on the above mentioned dependent variables consistently show that when 
reminded of their own mortality, people are more readily able to accept those that support their 
worldview and are more critical in their evaluations of those who challenge it (worldview 
defense) (Rosenblatt et aI., 1989). Rather, if asked not to write about a memory that is self­
focused and in tum asked to write an essay in relation to a political or moral issued felt strongly 
by the individual the narrative content and structure might differ from presently reported results. 
These differences might include proportionally more positive emotionality words when talking 
about an individual who supports their cultural worldview and proportionally more negative 
words when confronted with an individual who does not share the same opinion. 
Although, all of the previously mentioned studies deal with a mortality salience 
manipulation that is relatively homogeneous, that is, the manipulations were designed to have 
participants think about their own mortality but not to explicitly reflect on their respective lives 
(Burke et aI., 2010). More specifically, these manipulations may be different from other real-life 
reminders of death such as, near-death experiences or being diagnosed with a terminal illness, 
which individuals often react to with liberation and growth rather than defensiveness (Martin, 
Campbell, & Henry, 2004). Given the amount of death reminders that are present in everyday 
life research should continue to investigate whether more immediate and reflective real-world 
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death reminders lead to more growth-oriented behaviors as a means to buffer anxiety related 
worldview defenses (pyszczynski, Greeenberg, Solomon, & Maxfield, 2006). 
Limitations and Future Research 
While the present study revealed several findings on the interplay of mortality salience 
and self conditions, the experimental design did have several shortcomings. First, while a main 
feature of this study was the manipulation of the self it would have been beneficial to prime self­
awareness during the presentation of the mortality salience prime. In the present study, the 
manipulation of self was primed after the presentation of death-related questions and involved 
individuals to close their eyes while the narrative prompt was read out loud. 
Moreover, in the present study, one could argue that the mortality-salience condition and 
the exam condition both induce self-awareness which is evident by the fact that there were no 
statistically significant mean differences between the amount of references to self in both the 
mortality salience and exam salience condition. One possible reasoning behind this is that the 
prompt presented might have been too self-focused for a true control. One method of potentially 
controlling for this influence might be to present a narrative prompt that is focused towards being 
other-aware (vs. being self-aware) as in, "How would your best friend feel about your decision to 
come to Seton Hall University?" Moving awareness away from the self in the narrative prompt 
might lead to differences in the amounts of references to self, others, and emotionality words. 
Also, while the present manipulation of self may be beneficial when studying 
autobiographical memory it may have been presented too late in the current design to be able to 
elicit effects from the manipulation of mortality salience. That is, effects might have been more 
pronounced if self-awareness was primed during the presentation of open-ended death questions. 
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With that said, one possible future direction for this study could be to replicate this experiment 
with a different manipulation of provoking awareness of self. Arndt et al. (1998) manipulated 
self-awareness by utilizing a mirror that remained in the cubicle during the mortality salience 
manipulation as well as for the duration of the study in which participants were instructed to 
write a short story using either an internal or external focus of attention. Given the substantial 
evidence in the literature (Carver & Scheier, 1978, 1981; Duval & Wicklund, 1972) that suggests 
that mirrors increase self-awareness, it may be beneficial to employ this method in the future. 
Second, the fact that the present experiment did not find an effect of narrative length in 
that those in the mortality salience imagined self condition, as a whole, did not write narratives 
that were shorter in length in comparison to other conditions might be explained by the presence 
of the experimenter. Arndt et al. (1998) informed participants that they could leave the cubicles 
after they completed their narrative. In contrast, in the present study, the experimenter remained 
in the room with the participant for the duration of the session. Participants might have felt 
pressured to write for the full five minutes allotted to them. Future studies might look into 
whether presence of the experimenter would influence the effects of mortality salience. 
Additionally, the present study utilized only one approach to studying autobiographical memory, 
eliciting written narratives as opposed to oral narratives. While both types of memory recalls are 
considered to be valid, it would be interesting to compare and contrast autobiographical 
memories based on their specific mode of recall. 
As already suggested above, another step in filling the void in the literature might include 
a different kind of evaluation of the specific contribution of general anxiety responses or 
negative mood induction to the effects of mortality salience or other kinds of personal threats on 
performance. In particular, the influence of gender beliefs or roles on susceptibility to anxiety 
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effects would be an interesting factor to consider, perhaps as a mediator of emotional reactions in 
mortality salient situations. 
Lastly, mortality salience exerts its death-related defenses with the addition of a distractor 
task that allows for death related thoughts to exit consciousness while still remaining highly 
accessible. While the most commonly utilized distractor task is the positive and negative affect 
scale (PANAS) the present study used the word completion task. The word completion task 
might not have been the most beneficial distracter task to use in that some fragments have the 
potential to be filled in with words relating to death. While beneficial if measuring the 
accessibility of death related thoughts after the manipulation of mortality salience, in the present 
study this task might not have allowed for thoughts relating to death to be fully suppressed 
resulting in death thoughts that might have still been active in the mind of the participants while 
completing the autobiographical memory prompt. This could have been corrected by presenting 
the Spielberger State Anxiety Inventory directly after the mortality salience prime and moving 
the word completion task to the end of the study, which, additionally, would have afforded the 
inclusion of another analysis in relation to the accessibility of death-related thoughts by 
condition. 
In conclusion, while this study did not follow well-documented mortality salience 
patterns in relation to narrative length, the present findings should prompt further research into 
the relationship between mortality salience, self-awareness, and autobiographical memory. 
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Appendix A: Demographics Questionnaire 
Directions: Please fill in or answer each question below. Your data will remain confidential and 
will only be identified by your individual participant code. 
Information about yourself: 
Age: ____ 
Gender (circle one) 
M or F 
Year at Seton Hall (circle one): 
Other 
Do you have corrected vision? 

Y or N 

If so, did you remember to bring your glasses/contacts? 

Y or N 

Are you currently sick with an illness or taking any medication that affects your vision, level of 
attention, or other cognitive abilities') 
Y or N 
Do you have dyslexia or any other conditions that may affect your ability to read from a short 

distance? 

Y or N 

Please characterize your typing skills below: 

1. 	 Circle one: I am .. 

Faster than most people Slower than most Average 
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2. How does your typing compare to your friends: 
Faster 	 Slower Same 
3. 	 Are you comfortable using a computer to type? 
Yes / No 
4. 	 If no, why? 
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Appendix B: Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
Directions: Below is a list of statements dealing with your general feelings about yourself. If you 
strongly agree, circle Strongly Agree. If you agree with the statement, circle Agree. If you 
disagree, circle Disagree. If you strongly disagree, circle Strongly Disagree. 
1. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself. 
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
2. 	At times, I think I am no good at alL 
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
3. I feel that I have a number of good qualities. 
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
4. I am able to do things as well as most other people. 
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of 
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
6. I certainly feel useless at times. 
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
7. I feel that I'm a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others. 
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
8. I wish I could have more respect for myself. 
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
9. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure. 
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
10. I take a positive attitude toward myself. 
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
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Appendix C: Mortality Salience Prime 
The Projective Life Attitudes Assessment 
Directions: This assessment is a recently developed, innovative personality assessment. Recent research suggests 
that feelings and attitudes about significant aspects of life tell us a considerable amount about the individual's 
personality. Your responses to this survey will be content -analy zed in order to assess certain dimensions of y our 
personality. Your honest responses to the following questions will be appreciated. 
Please respond to them with your first, natural response. We are looking for peoples' gut-level reactions to these 
questions. You will have 5 minutes to complete this assessment. 
1. 	 PLEASE BRIEFL Y DESCRIBE THE EMOTIONS THAT THE THOUGHT OF YOUR 
OWN DEATH AROUSES IN YOu. 
2. 	 JOT DOWN, AS SPECIFICALLY AS YOU CAN, WHAT YOU THINK WILL 
HAPPEN TO YOU AS YOU PHY SICALL Y DIE AND ONCE YOU ARE 
PHYSICALLY DEAD. 
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Appendix D: Exam Salience Prime 
The Projective Life Attitudes Assessment 
Directions: This assessment is a recently developed, innovative personality assessment. Recent research suggests 
that feelings and attitudes about significant aspects of life tell us a considerable amount about the individual's 
personality. Your responses to this survey will be content-analyzed in order to assess certain dimensions of your 
personality . Your honest responses to the following questions will be appreciated. 
Please respond to them with your first, natural response. We are looking for peoples' gut-level reactions to these 
questions. You will have 5 minutes to complete this assessment. 
1. 	 PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCIBE THE EMOTIONS THAT THE THOUGHT OF AN 
UPCOMING EXAM AROUSES IN YOU 
2. 	 JOT DOWN, AS SPECIFICALLY AS YOU CAN, WHAT YOU WILL THINK WILL 
HAPPEN TO YOU WHEN YOU ARE TAKING THE EXAM AND ONCE YOU 
HA VE TURNED IN THE EXAM. 
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Appendix E: Word Completion Task 
Directions: Please fill in the blanks with the first word that comes to mind, you will have three 
minutes to complete this task. 
L VE EX T MU ER 
H TR 0 ST R Y A E 
DR N B E P ST R 
C MP T A T R W M 
SPEA COO H NT 
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Appendix F: Imagined Self Condition Memory Prompt 
Please follow these instructions: 
1. Now I want you to write about a very specific memory. 
Please close your eyes ... 
Think about YOUR first day of orientation at Seton Hall University. Think about the time of day, 
where you were, what the weather was like, what was going through your mind and any feelings 
associated with the memory. 
Please begin writing your memory in the Microsoft Word Document! 
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Appendix G: Non-Imagined Self Memory Prompt 
Please follow these instructions: 
1, Now I want you to write about a very specific memory. 
Tell me about YOUR first day of orientation at Seton Hall University. 
Please begin writing your memory in the Microsoft Word Document! 
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Appendix H: Spielberger State Anxiety Inventory 
Directions: A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given 
below. Read each statement and then circle the appropriate one to indicate how you feel right 
now, that is, at this moment. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time 
on anyone statement but give the answer which seems to describe your present feelings best. 
1. I feel calm 
Not at all Somewhat Moderately So Very Much So 
2. I feel secure 
Not at all Somewhat Moderately So Very Much So 
3. I am tense 
Not at all Somewhat Moderately So Very Much So 
4. I am regretful 
Not at all Somewhat Moderately So Very Much So 
5. I feel at ease 
Not at all Somewhat Moderately So Very Much So 
6. I feel upset 
Not at all Somewhat Moderately So Very Much So 
7. I am presently worrying over possible misfortunes 
Not at all Somewhat Moderately So Very Much So 
8. I feel rested 
Not at all Somewhat Moderately So Very Much So 
9. I feel anxious 
Not at all Somewhat Moderately So Very Much So 
10. I feel comfortable 
Not at all Somewhat Moderately So Very Much So 
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11. I feel self-confident 
Not at all 
12. I feel nervous 
Not at all 
13. I am jittery 
Not at all 
14. I feel "high strung" 
Not at all 
15. I am relaxed 
Not at all 
16. I feel content 
Not at all 
] 7. I am worried 
Not at all 
18. I feel overexcited and rattled 
Not at all Somewhat 
19. I feel joyful 
Not at all Somewhat 
20. I feel pleasant 
Not at all Somewhat 
Moderately So Very Much So 
Moderately So Very Much So 
Moderately So Very Much So 
Moderately So Very Much So 
Moderately So Very Much So 
Moderately So Very Much So 
Moderately So Very Much So 
Moderately So Very Much So 
Moderately So Very Much So 
Moderately So Very Much So 
Somewhat 
Somewhat 
Somewhat 
Somewhat 
Somewhat 
Somewhat 
Somewhat 
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Appendix I: Narrative Coding 

(adapted from Buckner & Fivush, 1998) 

A. Narrative Structure 
I. 	 Narrative Length 
a. 	 Number ofoff-task words: Off-task words such as, "My first day of 
orientation at Seton Hall University", ''I'm done", and "I don't 
remember much after that" were not included in the memory length. 
b. 	 Number of Words: Memory length was determined by using the "word 
count" Microsoft Word tool. Memory length was calculated as the 
number of words minus the number of off-task words. 
B. Narrative Content 
I. 	 Emotion Words: Emotional feeling state words (happy, sad, afraid) were counted 
along with emotional behaviors (crying, laughing). Statements about positive and 
negative effects ("I liked it") were also included. Words that served to intensify 
the emotion word ("I really liked it") were also included in the overall count. 
a. 	 General Emotional Words - Emotional terms that were not necessarily 
ascribed to any particular person(s), "it was a good day", "the weather was 
beautiful", etc. 
b. 	 Emotional Words Pertaining to Self-Words that made references to the 
writer's own emotional state. 
c. 	 Emotional Words Pertaining to Others Words describing the emotional 
states of others perceived by the writer of the narrative 
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d. 	 We/Group Emotional Words - Words describing simultaneously the 
emotional states ofothers as well as the write ofthe narrative 
e. 	 Total Emotional Words - The summation of all the aforementioned 
categories of emotional words taken together as a whole 
II. 	 References: Indications about a particular person or persons in the narrative 
account 
a. 	 References to self-The frequency of terms referring to the self ("I", "me", 
or use of own first name) was counted 
b. 	 References to others - The frequency of references referring to proper 
names and other-person pronouns, as well as specific different 
relationships (mother, father, sister, brother, friend); it included the vague 
mention of others ("someone in my group") as well as "we-ness" terms 
which included pronouns and other terms aligning/affiliating the self with 
others (us, we, our(s) were counted. 
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